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1. Introduction
Price discrimination is a subject on which economic analysis conflicts with
popular opinion and legal practice. While non-economists may believe that
“absolute power corrupts absolutely,” economists often argue that increasing
the power of a monopolist by allowing it to price discriminate will enhance
efficiency. Indeed, we teach undergraduates that a monopolist who can per-
fectly price discriminate will be efficient.1 While price discrimination may be
unattractive in the monopoly context on distributional grounds, such con-
siderations are absent in monopolistically competitive markets where free
entry drives profits to zero. This paper examines such a situation—we in-
vestigate the efficiency of free-entry equilibria when firms have the ability to
practice perfect price discrimination, constrained only by the competition
they face from rival firms, and unconstrained by informational limitations
about consumer characteristics.
This question has most directly been addressed in the influential work of
Spence (1976a), whose conclusion was sweeping: “if sellers can price dis-
criminate in an appropriate sense, the welfare aspects of the product choice
problem are eliminated” (pp. 217–8).2 Spence’s argument is simple and
seems compelling. He argues that with perfect price discrimination, each
seller will be able to capture her marginal contribution to consumer welfare
and hence her profits coincide with her marginal contribution to social wel-
fare. In consequence, a producer will choose her product variety so as to
maximize her marginal contribution, i.e., to maximize social welfare. Fur-
thermore, entry decisions will be efficient, since a firm will enter the market
if and only if its marginal contribution exceeds the entry cost. Spence’s
argument implies that inefficiencies arise in models of oligopoly only be-
cause consumer characteristics are private information (or perhaps if there
are legal restrictions on price discrimination) and not due to the exercise of
market power per se. Spence’s argument also finds application to models of
common agency with perfect information (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986),
which have been widely used to study the labor market as well as the gov-
ernment contracting and lobbying process. Spence’s argument suggests that
if one can ensure that each principal can capture her marginal contribution
to the agent’s utility, then this would imply that investment/entry incen-
tives for the principal are correctly specified and the overall outcome will be
efficient, from the point of view of the principals and the agent.3
1This argument has echoes in development economics—radical economists often argue
that traditional village landlords are both extortionate and inefficient. The orthodox
response to this is that a landlord who is fully exploitative must be efficient, so that
inefficiencies must arise from an absence of total power.
2There is much work examining the efficiency consequences of imperfect price discrim-
ination in the context of oligopoly or monopolistic competition—Armstrong and Vickers
(1999), Borenstein (1985), Corts (1998), Katz (1984), Rochet and Stole (2001) and Stole
(1995) are prominent examples (see also the Varian, 1989, survey). However, previous
work on perfect price discrimination has been limited, perhaps because Spence’s results
seem so unambiguous.
3This point has been emphasized by Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2001), who consequently
focus on the conditions under which each principal gets her marginal contribution in
equilibrium.
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This paper re-examines this question more carefully, and provides a com-
prehensive analysis of the welfare consequences of perfect price discrimina-
tion. Spence’s argument is correct, but only in some respects. For example,
we show that if the number of firms is given, each firm will choose product
variety so as to maximize its contribution to social welfare and hence vari-
ety choices correspond to a decentralized maximizer of social welfare—this
is often (but not always) a global maximizer of welfare. However, our most
striking result is a negative one—entry will be excessive, even if each firm
captures its marginal contribution to social welfare. The key question to
ask is, “what is the marginal contribution relative to?” We find that the
marginal firm captures its marginal contribution relative to an inefficient
allocation rather than an efficient one and this is the reason why there is
excessive entry.
The basic argument is as follows. Assume that for any integer n, if n
firms enter, they will choose their product characteristics so as to maximize
social welfare. Denote this optimal choice by θ = (θ1, θ2, . . . , θn), where
θi denotes the choice of firm i. On the other hand, if n − 1 firms were
to enter, the welfare maximizing choice would be the n − 1 vector θ′ =
(θ′1, θ
′
2, . . . , θ
′
n−1). Hence the increase in welfare due to the entry of the
marginal firm is W (θ) −W (θ′). However, the profits of the marginal firm,
n, are given by its marginal contribution to social welfare at the vector θ so
that profits equalW (θ)−W (θ1, θ2, . . . , θn−1). Since θ′ is welfare maximizing
when there are n− 1 firms, it follows that W (θ′) ≥W (θ1, θ2, . . . , θn−1) and
hence the profits of the marginal firm are always greater than its contribution
to social welfare. In consequence, there will always be too much entry.
This argument shows that there will always be excess entry, in a weak
sense. It also makes it easy to verify when we get strict excess entry and the
cases when the number of firms is optimal. If the optimal product character-
istics (or “locations”) with n− 1 firms are a subset of the optimal product
characteristics with n firms, then free entry gives the optimal number of
firms. If this is not the case, so that optimality requires that we “re-locate”
the n − 1 firms when we add an additional firm, then there will always
be strict incentives for excess entry. Inefficiency arises quite generally in
location type models—for example, in the Hotelling or Salop models with
uniformly distributed consumers, optimality requires that firms be spaced
apart, so that we must re-locate the n− 1 firms when we add the n-th firm,
giving rise to excess entry. On the other hand, in the Dixit-Stiglitz model,
product variety is irrelevant. The varieties chosen by n−1 firms are trivially
also optimal when the additional firm enters, and so free entry produces the
optimal number of firms.
The basic results of this paper are quite general and apply to discrete
choice models (where each consumer only consumes a single variety) as well
as representative consumer models, where the consumer desires variety. We
begin with the Salop model as an illustration in Section 2. We then formulate
a general framework for analyzing both discrete choice models and preference
for variety models in Section 3. The final Section concludes.
PERFECT PRICE DISCRIMINATION 3
2. An Example: The Hotelling-Salop Model
We begin with an illustration using the well-known Hotelling/Salop model.
A unit measure of consumers is uniformly distributed on the line (Hotelling)
or unit circle (Salop). Consumers have inelastic unit demand and incur a
transportation cost T (d) when purchasing a good, which is strictly increas-
ing in the distance travelled, d. For example, transportation costs could be
given by t|x− i|α where x is the consumer’s location, i is the firm’s location,
and t and α are strictly positive. If α = 1, we have linear transportation
costs, as in the original Salop formulation. Firms’ marginal costs are con-
stant, and each firm incurs a fixed cost F if it enters the market. We assume
that there are infinitely many potential firms, i.e., the number of potential
entrants is greater than the number which actually enter in any equilibrium.
The game we analyze has three stages. In the first stage, each potential firm
(from an infinite or sufficiently large set) must decide whether to enter or
not. In stage 2, each entrant firm observes the number of entrants, n, and
chooses a product variety. In stage 3, firms compete by offering a consumer
specific price to each consumer. (We discuss alternative extensive forms in
section 3.6).
With perfect price discrimination, firms compete Bertrand style, sepa-
rately for each consumer. For any consumer x, the firm which is nearest to
that consumer, i, will limit price the firm which is the next nearest, j. In
particular, firm j will price at marginal cost (c) while the consumer will buy
from firm i at a price T (|j − x|)− T (|i− x|) + c. That is, firm i charges the
consumer its cost c plus the saving in transportation cost that the consumer
makes by consuming from i rather than j. We see therefore that firm i’s
profits from any consumer equal itsmarginal contribution to that consumer’s
welfare, less the cost of provision. The profits of a firm therefore coincide
with its marginal contribution to social welfare. Consumption choices are
also efficient—the consumer always buys from the right firm.
Now let us consider location choice given that n firms have entered the
market. Since the firm’s profits at the pricing stage equal its marginal con-
tribution to social welfare, the firm will choose its location so as to maximize
its marginal contribution. For example, in the Hotelling model, if n = 2,
and if firm 1 expects firm 2 to locate at y ≥ 1
2
, then firm 1 will locate at y/3.
Since firm 2 similarly seeks to maximize its marginal contribution, in a Nash
equilibrium the firms locate at ( 1
4
, 3
4
), the socially optimal locations. This
may be contrasted with the well known social inefficiency of equilibrium
locations when firms cannot price discriminate—when transport costs are
quadratic, firms will locate at the endpoints of the interval in order soften
price competition. Similarly, in the Salop model, if n ≥ 3, each price dis-
criminating firm will locate halfway between its two immediate neighbors,
leading firms to be located socially optimally, at distance 1
n
from each other.
Let us now consider entry. Despite the fact that location and pricing
decisions are efficient, entry decisions will be inefficient, and there will be
excess entry. Consider optimal locations with n − 1 firms in the market.
These locations are equally spaced around the circle, so that each firm is at
distance 1/(n− 1) from its neighbor. If n firms enter the market, they will
locate equidistantly and hence at distance 1/n from each other. Hence the
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welfare contribution of the marginal (nth) firm is the difference in welfare
between the latter and the former situation. On the other hand, the profits
of the marginal firm equal its contribution to welfare when the other n− 1
firms are unequally spaced, so that the distance between firm 1 and firm
n − 1 is 2/n, while the distances between all other adjacent pairs of firms
is 1/n. Hence the profits of the marginal firm are given by its marginal
contribution to welfare relative to an inefficient configuration of n−1 firms,
whereas its contribution to welfare is its marginal contribution relative to an
efficient configuration of n − 1 firms. Hence profits are excessive and there
is excess entry.
One can explicitly compute equilibrium outcomes and the social optimum
in some simple cases. If transportation costs are given by T (d) = tdα,
the ratio of the free entry equilibrium number of firms (n∗) to the socially
optimal number of firms nˆ is given by
n∗
nˆ
= 2
(
1− 2−α
α
) 1
1+α
When α = 1, (the case of linear transport costs) n∗ =
√
t/2F while nˆ =√
t/4F , and free entry results in
√
2 as many firms as is socially optimal,
i.e., there are approximately 40% extra firms. Similarly, with quadratic
transportation costs, there are 3
√
3 as many firms under free entry as is
socially optimal—this is again approximately 40% extra.
2.1. Comparing Discriminatory and Uniform Prices. At one level,
our result seems to follow from standard intuition about entry in models of
monopolistic competition when firms are unable to price discriminate. Due
to the business stealing effect, excess entry can occur with uniform prices,
but it is mitigated because of the inability of the marginal entrant to capture
its marginal contribution to social welfare. Indeed, this inability may result
in insufficient entry. This intuition might suggest that price discrimination
would aggravate the excess entry problem. We now show that this is not
necessarily the case—price discrimination intensifies competition between
firms, and often leads to lower profits, as compared to uniform pricing. In
consequence, excess entry is often greater under uniform pricing than under
discriminatory pricing.
Let us consider a simple Hotelling model where one firm is located at 0
and the other firm at 1, and compare profits under price discrimination, and
under uniform pricing. Now if profits are higher (lower) with uniform pric-
ing, it will also be the case that profits will be higher (lower) under uniform
pricing in the Salop model when there are n firms. In other words, a profit
comparison in this simple Hotelling model suffices to establish whether price
discrimination aggravates or ameliorates excess entry in the Salop model.
The uniform price equilibrium will have price (net of marginal cost) equal
to to the derivative of the transportation cost function evaluated at the mid-
point of the interval, T ′(1
2
). Since firms share the market equally, profits are
given by piL = T
′(1
2
)/2. So in the case of linear or quadratic transporta-
tion costs, price equals t and piU = t/2. In Figure 1, firm 0’s profit equals
PERFECT PRICE DISCRIMINATION 5
location
0 1
tr
an
sp
or
ta
ti
on
co
st
tt
1/2
Figure 1. Prices and profits with discriminatory and uni-
form prices
the rectangle with hieght t and width 1/2—this is the shaded area, which
comprises of three shaded triangles.
Under price discrimination, profits are given by
piD =
∫ 1
1
2
[T (x)− T (1− x)]dx
With linear or quadratic transport costs, we find that piD =
t
4
, i.e., one-half
of profits under uniform prices. Indeed, with uniform prices, a firm charges
each consumer the price of t, while under discriminatory prices, it is only
able to charge t to the consumer located at its own location, over whom it has
maximum monopoly power.4 In Figure 1, firm 0 charges a price equal to the
distance between the downward and upward sloping lines or zero, whichever
is greater, earning profits equal to area of the darker shaded triangle. This
difference in profits is reflected in the fact that price discrimination reduces
entry in the Salop model, as compared to the uniform pricing case. With
uniform pricing and linear transportation costs the equilibrium number of
firms is
√
t/F , which is twice as large as the socially optimal number of firms,
and larger than
√
t/2F , the number of firms under price discrimination.
To summarize, although there is still too much entry under price discrim-
ination, it does reduce excess entry to some extent, in standard versions
of the Salop model. Our finding echoes that of Corts (1998) who shows
that oligopolistic price discrimination can intensify competition and reduce
profits. This competitive effect ameliorates excess entry without eliminating
it.
3. A General Model of Product Differentiation
We now analyze the efficiency of free entry equilibrium in a general model
of product differentiation. The extensive form we analyze has three stages, as
follows. In the first stage, each potential firm (from an infinite or sufficiently
4More generally, when T (x) = txα, we find that price discrimination reduces profits
unless transportation costs are extremely convex—the critical value of α below which this
is the case is approximately equal to 5.
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large set) must decide whether to enter or not. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the
set of entrants. In stage 2, each entrant firm observes n and chooses a prod-
uct variety. In stage 3, firms compete by offering a consumer specific price
to each consumer. In each of these stages, firms make their decisions simul-
taneously. Throughout, we shall focus attention on pure strategy equilibria.
If we were to allow mixed equilibria, these would typically be inefficient and
one could not expect price discrimination to ensure efficiency.
Assume that each firm i ∈ N must choose θi ∈ Θ where Θ is a compact
metric space. We interpret θi as the characteristic of the product or “loca-
tion” for short. Let θ = (θ1, θ2, . . . , θn) ∈ Θn denote the vector of location
choices. We now analyze the pricing stage of the game, considering in turn
two possible models of consumer preference.
3.1. Pricing: Discrete Choice Models. In a discrete choice model, each
consumer purchases only one of the n varieties offered, although the amount
that she consumes could be variable. Let λ ∈ Λ parameterize the utility of
the consumer, and let u(xi, θi, λ) +Z denote her utility when she consumes
xi units of the product with characteristic θi and Z units of an outside nu-
meraire. Let c(xi, θi) denote the cost of firm i when it produces the product
with characteristic θi. The maximal social value that can be generated in a
trade between firm i and the consumer is defined by
bi(θi, λ) = max
xi
u(xi, θi, λ)− c(xi, θi)
Note that bi(θi, λ) is non-negative since c(0, θi) is assumed to be zero. Let
xˆi be a corresponding maximizer of the expression on the right. Since the
consumer may only consume the product of one firm, the maximal social
value over all feasible trades is given by
(1) V (N,θ, λ) = max
i
(bi(θi, λ))
The marginal contribution of any firm i is defined by
Mi(N,θ, λ) = V (N,θ, λ)− V (N \ {i},θ, λ),
Clearly, at most one firm makes a strictly positive marginal contribution, in
any given trade. If we assume that firms compete Bertrand fashion in making
take it or leave offers to the consumer, then in any admissible equilibrium
where firms do not price below cost, the consumer will buy the optimal
quantity from the efficient firm (which maximizes social values), on terms
such that this firm (and every other firm) will earn its marginal contribution
as profits. The consumer will get a net payoff equal to V (N \{i∗},θ), where
i∗ is the index of the efficient firm. In other words, a mild refinement of
Nash equilibrium, which rules out rival firms pricing below cost, suffices to
ensure that price discriminating firms capture their marginal contribution.5
5There do exist Nash equilibria where the consumer buys from the best firm at a lower
price, due to the next best firm pricing below cost, but these involve weakly dominated
strategies and are hence not admissible or even limit admissible equilibria (see Simon and
Stinchcombe (1995) for these refinements for infinite games).
PERFECT PRICE DISCRIMINATION 7
3.2. Pricing: Preference for Variety Models. Let us consider the case
where the consumer consumes more than one variety of the product. If
the consumer consumes xi units of product i, i.e., the consumption vector
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn+, then her utility is given by U(x,θ, λ)+Z, where
Z denotes the consumption of the outside good and λ is the consumer’s
characteristic.
The analysis of pricing is now more complicated than in the case of a
discrete choice model. We assume that each firm i may offer a price schedule
pi : R+ → R, which specifies the price pi (xi) that the consumer must pay for
any quantity xi > 0 that he chooses to consume. Given the profile of price
schedules {pi}i∈N , the consumer chooses a best response, i.e., a quantity
vector x to maximize
(2) U(x,θ, λ)−
∑
i∈N
pi(xi)
The payoff to firm i when the consumer chooses x depends only on the
component xi and equals pi(xi) − ci(xi, θi). A Nash equilibrium is an n-
tuple of pricing schedules, {pi}i∈N and a best response consumption vector
x, where each pi is a best response to the price schedules offered by others.
Fix a consumption vector x∗ = (x∗i ,x
∗
−i). Adapting Bernheim and Whin-
ston (1986), we say that a pricing schedule is truthful relative to x if for
any x′i, pi(x
′
i) − ci(x′i, θi) = pi(xi) − ci(xi, θi). It follows therefore that any
truthful pricing schedule, (relative to any x∗i ) has a simple “cost plus” or
two-part character:
(3) pi(xi) = ci(xi, θi) + yi
That is, the price charged by a firm for purchased quantity xi in truthful
pricing schedule equals the cost of producing xi plus a term, yi, which is
independent the quantity purchased. Different truthful pricing schedules
differ only with the values of the fixed term, yi. A truthful equilibrium is a
vector of truthful pricing schedules.
We now turn to a characterization of truthful equilibrium outcomes. The
maximal total payoff that the consumer and all firms (in N) can realize is
given by
(4) V (N,θ, λ) = max
x
(
U(x,θ, λ)−
∑
i∈N
ci(xi, θi)
)
Similarly, the total payoff that the consumer and any subset S ⊂ N of firms
can realize is given by
(5) V (S,θ, λ) = max
{xi}i∈S
(
U({xi}i∈S ,θ, λ)−
∑
i∈S
ci(xi, θi)
)
Define the marginal contribution of any subset S of firms as
MS(N,θ, λ) = V (N,θ, λ)− V (N \ S,θ, λ),
where N \S is the complement of N relative to S. The marginal contribution
of firm i, is given by
Mi(N,θ, λ) = V (N,θ, λ)− V (N \ {i},θ, λ),
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Bernheim and Whinston (1986) show that all truthful equilibria are coali-
tion proof Nash equilibria in the game between the principals, and are
efficient. In our context, this implies that the total payoff must equal
V (N,θ, λ). Letting pii denote the profits of firm i, they also show that
in any truthful equilibrium, for every S ⊂ N
(6)
∑
i∈S
pii ≤MS(N,θ, λ).
Furthermore, for every firm j, there must exist some S ⊂ N , where j ∈ S
such that the above inequality holds as an equality. From these conditions
it follows that each firm will earn its marginal contribution (pii = Mi) in
any truthful equilibrium, under the following assumption which we adopt
henceforth.
Assumption 1. For any subset S of firms, the sum of marginal contributions
is less than the marginal contribution of the subset S:
(7)
∑
i∈S
Mi(N,θ, λ) ≤MS(N,θ, λ).
If this condition is satisfied for every subset S of N , then clearly the
profits of each firm i ∈ N in any truthful equilibrium will equal its marginal
contribution, Mi(N,θ, λ). If this condition is not satisfied, then it follows
that each firm cannot capture its marginal contribution as revenues—if S is
a subset of N such that Assumption 1 is not satisfied, and if firm revenues
equal marginal contributions, then the consumer will be better off rejecting
the offers of all firms in S.6
3.3. Many consumers. Now let us suppose that there are many con-
sumers. We have already seen that in the single consumer case, a firm will
capture its marginal contribution to this consumer’s welfare, both in the
discrete choice model and in the preference for variety model. With many
consumers and many firms, this will be true for each consumer, provided
that there is no inter-relationship between different markets (i.e., different
consumers). Let us assume therefore that:
Assumption 2. Each firm has has constant marginal costs of production,
which may depend upon the variety it produces (θi) but not the quantity
produced.
Under this assumption, in the discrete choice case, the net benefit that the
firm can offer to any consumer does not depend upon the purchases of other
consumers. Similarly, with preference for variety, a firm can offer a truthful
pricing schedule to each consumer, where the price paid by a consumer
equals yi + ci(θi)xi, where ci(θi) is the constant marginal cost of firm i.
7
This means that one can analyze competition for each consumer separately,
6These conditions are analogous to those set out by Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2001)
and Laussel and Le Breton (2001), in the context of common agency models. We discuss
the relation between models of price discrimination and common agency models in greater
detail in the following section.
7Stuart (2001) provides examples showing that with many consumers, marginal con-
tribution equilibria may not exist with increasing or decreasing marginal costs.
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and our previous results apply. That is, firm i will capture its marginal
contribution to each consumer’s welfare, and its profits, corresponding to
the characteristic vector θ, are given by:
(8) pii(N,θ) =
∫
Λ
Mi(N,θ, λ)dG(λ)dλ
where G(λ) is the distribution function of consumer characteristics λ.
3.4. Product Characteristics. Consider now the choice of product char-
acteristics. We have established that if marginal costs are constant, then
the profits of a firm coincide with its marginal contribution, quite generally
in the discrete choice model and in any truthful equilibrium when there is
preference for variety. That is, a firm’s profits at the profile θ are given
(9) p˜ii(θ) = V (N,θ)− V (N \ {i},θ)
Now if we show that V (N \ {i},θ) does not depend upon θi, it follows
that firm i will choose θi to maximize V (N,θ). We establish this in the
preference for variety model—an identical argument applies for the discrete
choice model. Recall the definition of V (N \ {i},θ):
(10) V (N \ {i},θ) = max
x−i

U(x−i,θ)− ∑
j∈N\{i}
cj(θj)xj


Examining the above expression, we see that U(x−i,θ) does not depend
upon θi. Hence the maximized value of the expression on the right does
not depend upon θi. Thus we see that if each firm chooses θi to maximize
p˜ii(θ), then V (N,θ) cannot be increased by altering any single component
θi, so that θ is a decentralized maximizer of social welfare. Therefore the
profit maximizing characteristic θ∗i also maximizes welfare and vice versa.
Indeed, it follows that any decentralized maximizer of welfare must be a Nash
equilibrium and conversely every Nash equilibrium must be a decentralized
welfare maximizer.
The following example shows that one may have several characteristic
vectors which are decentralized maximizers of welfare, whereas only one of
these maximizes welfare globally. Since any decentralized maximizer is a
Nash equilibrium, this shows that one can have coordination failures which
prevent efficiency. One cannot expect price discrimination to prevent such
coordination failures.8
Example 1. Let there be two firms, N = {1, 2} and let the set of pos-
sible locations equal Θ = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} as in Figure 2. A unit mass of
8Lederer and Hurter (1986) have also provided a similar example, where equilibrium
locations under perfect price discrimination need not be globally optimal. It is easy to
provide an example in a preference for variety model with complementary goods. Let
there be two firms and suppose that each firm i ∈ {1, 2} must choose θi ∈ [0, 1], where θi
is the quality of the product. The consumer consumes one or zero units of each product
and obtains positive utility only by consuming both products. If she consumes both
products, her utility given by U(θ1, θ2) = V (min(θ1, θ2)). There will be a multiplicity of
pairs θ1 = θ2 which are decentralized welfare maximizers even though there is only one
which is globally optimal. With heterogenous consumers, we have seen that one can have
such coordination failures even with substitute products.
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Figure 2. An example with an inefficient locational equilibrium
consumers is distributed across these locations, with mass αi at location
i. Let {α1, α2, α3, α4, α5} = {.25, .35, .2, .15, .05}. Each consumer has in-
elastic unit demand for the product and incurs a transport cost—if the
consumer at i purchases from the firm at location j, the transport cost is
T (min{| i− j |, | i+5− j |}). If the two firms locate at different places, then
the maximum distance that any consumer has to travel is 2. Let T (0) = 0,
T (1) = 1 and T (2) = 4. The welfare criterion is therefore the sum of trans-
port costs incurred by all the consumers in this market. For example, if the
firms locate at (1, 2), total transport costs are (α3+α5)T (1)+α4T (2) = .85,
whereas if locations are (1, 3), transport costs are (α2+α4+α5)T (1) = .55.
It follows that (1, 3) is a decentralized maximizer of the welfare function.
To verify this, note that neither firm can raise welfare by moving to lo-
cation 2 and nor can the firm at 1 raise welfare by moving to 5 or the
firm at 3 by moving to 4, by our assumption that T (2) is large relative to
T (1). If the firm at 1 moves to location 5, the increase in transport costs is
(α1−α5)T (1) = .2 which is strictly positive. Similarly, if firm at 3 moves to
location 4, the increase in transport costs is (α3 − α4)T (1) = .05, which is
strictly positive. One can also verify that (2, 4) is a decentralized maximizer
of the welfare function with total transportation cost (α1+α3+α5)T (1) = .5.
Both these decentralized maximizers are Nash equilibria in the game where
firms choose locations although only the latter is a global maximum.9 Hence
Nash equilibria need not globally maximize welfare.
It is also instructive to consider the profits of the firms. In the equilibrium
(1, 3), the firm at 1 earns α5[T (2) − T (1)] = .15, while the firm at 3 earns
9In general, if maxαiT (1) < minj αjT (2) and α2 > α1 > α3 > α4 > α5 then both (1, 3)
and (2, 4) are decentralized welfare maxima and Nash equilibria. The global maximum of
the welfare function depends upon the relative sizes of (α1 + α3) and (α2 + α4): if the
former is larger, (1, 3) is globally optimal, whereas if the latter is larger, (2, 4) is globally
optimal.
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α4[T (2)−T (1)] = .45. In the equilibrium (2, 4), the firm at 2 earns α1[T (2)−
T (1)] = .75, while the firm at 4 earns α5[T (2)−T (1)] = .15. Hence the profit
vector at (2, 4) weakly dominates (in sense of a vector inequality) the profit
vector at (1, 3), even though welfare is greater at (1, 3). In consequence
firms may not have any incentives to coordinate their decisions in order to
achieve a welfare optimum.
These coordination problems do not arise in the Hotelling and Salop mod-
els, every locational configuration which is a decentralized maximizer of
welfare also maximizes welfare globally.10 For example, given any locational
configuration with n− 1 firms located arbitrarily around the circle, the nth
firm will choose to locate between the two firms which are maximally far
apart and will also locate equidistant between them. Therefore, in any
Nash equilibrium, firms are equally spaced, since otherwise some firm could
do better. We shall therefore adopt the following assumption, in order to
rule out coordination failures:
Assumption 3. If θ∗ is a decentralized maximizer of the total welfare function
V (N, θ), then θ∗ is a global maximizer of V (N, θ).
3.5. Entry. Let us now analyze entry, assuming that each firm can capture
its marginal contribution at the pricing stage, and also that the profile of
product characteristics is always globally optimal. For any integer m, let θ∗m
denote an optimalm-vector of product characteristics, letM = {1, 2, . . . ,m}
and let V (M,θ∗m) denote the corresponding social welfare. The change in
welfare associated with the entry of the nth firm is
(11) ∆W (n) = V (N,θ∗n)− V (N \ {n},θ∗n−1)− Fn.
where Fn is the entry cost of this firm. On the other hand, the profits of
the marginal firm n are given by its marginal contribution:
(12) p˜i(n) = V (N,θ∗n)− V (N \ {n},θ∗n)− Fn.
It follows that the difference between profits and contribution to welfare is
given by
(13) pi(n)−∆W (n) = V (N \ {n},θ∗n−1)− V (N \ {n},θ∗n).
Recall that we have assumed that for any integer m, the profile θ∗m maxi-
mizes the function V (M,θ) over all θ ∈ Θm. Since this true whenm = n−1,
it follows that pi(n) −∆W (n) ≥ 0 and hence the profits from entry exceed
the welfare contribution. Therefore one has excess entry, at least in a weak
sense.
We summarize our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In a general model of product differentiation where firms
satisfy assumption 2 (i.e. have constant marginal costs):
i) Output choices are efficient in the pricing stage and each firm captures
its marginal contribution in a) any limit admissible equilibrium in the
discrete choice model and b) in any truthful equilibrium in the preference
for variety model provided that Assumption 1 is satisfied.
10The decentralized maximizer is unique in Hotelling, while in the Salop model, there
is a continuum of decentralized maximizers, all of which yield identical levels of welfare.
Concavity of u (or U) in xi and θi (or x and θ) is a sufficient condition for global optimality.
12 V. BHASKAR AND TED TO
ii) If each firm can capture its marginal contribution, product variety choice
for a fixed number of firms corresponds to a decentralized maximizer
of total welfare. The socially optimal product varieties are always an
equilibrium outcome.
iii) If output and product variety choices are always efficient for any number
of entrants, then the profits of the marginal entrant are always weakly
greater than its contribution to social welfare.
Our analysis also makes clear the conditions under which one has excess
entry in a strict sense, and when entry is optimal. If {θ∗in}i∈N\{n}, the opti-
mal product characteristic vector of the first n− 1 firms when n firms enter
the market is different from θ∗n−1, the optimal locational configuration when
n − 1 firms enter, then pi(n) − ∆W (n) > 0 and one has excess incentives
for entry. On the other hand, if {θ∗in}i∈N\{n} is still an optimal locational
configuration when only n− 1 firms enter, then incentives for entry are per-
fectly aligned with social welfare maximization. That is, free entry ensures
efficiency if and only if it is the case that the set of locations in an efficient
locational configuration with n − 1 firms is a subset of the set of efficient
locations when there are n firms. This characterization makes it particularly
easy to apply our analysis applies to a wide variety of models of product
differentiation.
(1) In the standard Dixit-Stiglitz model, product characteristics are ir-
relevant, and only the number of products matters. Equivalently, for
any integer m, every choice of product characteristics is optimal. It
follows that the set of locations in an efficient locational configura-
tion with n− 1 firms is a subset of the set of efficient locations when
there are n firms, and hence price discrimination ensures efficiency
in this model. However, if we modify preferences so that optimal
variety choices depend on the number of available varieties,11 then
there will be overentry.
(2) Consider the model of vertical differentiation, as in Gabszewicz and
Thisse (1980) or Shaked and Sutton (1983), where consumers are
heterogeneous in terms of their willingness to pay for quality and
where providing higher quality is also costly. The set of optimal
qualities when there are n− 1 entrants is not, in general, a subset of
the set of optimal qualities when there are n entrants. For example,
it is easily verified that with one firm, the optimal quality is inter-
mediate between the optimal quality pair when there are two firms.
Hence there will be excess entry.
(3) Consider the model of Deneckere and Rothschild (1992),12 where
there are K possible brands and a each consumer has a ranking of
these brands, so that there are K! types of consumer and where
each consumer’s cardinal utility from a product depends only upon
its rank. The distribution of consumer types is symmetric if each of
11For example, suppose that varieities must be chosen in the interval [0, 1], with the
optimal varieties with n firms being equally spaced along this interval, i.e. at distance 1
n
from each other. Since the optimal varieties depend on n, there will be overentry.
12This model is closely related to that of Perloff and Salop (1985), so our comments
apply equally to their model.
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these K! types is equally numerous. In the symmetric case, it is clear
that every brand of product is equally efficient and hence the entry
decisions will be efficient. However, if the distribution of consumer
types is not symmetric, then the optimal set of brands with n − 1
consumers will not in general be a subset of the set of optimal set
of brands with n consumers. In this case, entry decisions will not be
efficient. It is easy to construct such asymmetric examples.
3.6. Simultaneous Entry and Location Choice. Our results are very
different from Spence, who argued that with perfect price discrimination,
one has optimal production, product variety and entry.13 His result depends
crucially on the assumption that firms must simultaneously make their entry
and location decisions. To understand Spence’s argument, let us return to
the Salop model and consider a situation where n − 1 firms are already in
the market, at fixed locations which are equally spaced around the circle.
Suppose that an additional firm, n, is now given the option to enter the
market and consider its entry decision. If this firm enters the market, it will
be able to capture, as revenues, the increase in consumer surplus that such
entry causes. If these revenues are greater than its costs, the firm will enter,
but since such revenues are the firm’s marginal contribution to social welfare,
the firm’s entry decision will be efficient. Furthermore, if the firm does enter,
it will choose a location which results in the largest marginal contribution to
social welfare. In other words, we see that the firm’s entry/location decision
must be a decentralized maximizer of social welfare.14
In our model, free entry does not result in social efficiency precisely be-
cause the entry of an additional firm does not leave the locations of the other
n firms unchanged, since entry takes place in the first stage, before location
decisions are made. In effect, if a firm enters “between” two other firms, all
the firms rearrange themselves so that they are now equidistant from each
other in the new situation. This implies that the revenues of the entrant
are greater as compared to the fixed location case, since its two neighbors
make room for it. Hence the equivalence between the marginal contribution
to consumers’ utility and the entrant’s revenues no longer holds and entry
is no longer efficient.
This discussion suggests that the inefficient entry only takes place because
entry decisions affect subsequent location choices. Hence we consider a game
where entry and location choices are made simultaneously, prior to pricing
decisions being taken. In other words, in stage 1 firms have to decide whether
to enter or not. If they enter, they also have to choose location. In stage
2, firms observe the entry/location decisions and choose consumer specific
prices.
13Although it is in the context of a model with linear pricing, Spence (1976b, Section
I.D) does discuss deviations from optimality of entry decisions due to business stealing
effects.
14Formally, if X is the set of possible locations and we augment this to X∪{0} where 0
denotes the decision to stay out, the argument of the subsection on product characteristics
shows that such augmented location decisions must be decentralized maximizers of social
welfare.
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Let us analyze the Salop model, using this extensive form. From our
previous analysis of location choice, it follows that any equilibrium must have
the firms equally spaced, since otherwise a firm could increase its profits by
changing location. Let pi(n) be firm profits given that n firms have entered at
equally spaced locations. For n¯ to be an equilibrium, we must have pi(n¯) ≥ 0.
We must also have that the profit of an additional entrant must be less than
zero, given the entry and location choices of these n firms. Any optimal
location for an additional entrant is halfway between two other firms. The
profits at this configuration are given by pi(2n¯), i.e., the profits of a typical
firm when 2n¯ firms are equally spaced around the circle. Hence we must
have that the equilibrium satisfies {n¯ | pi(n¯) ≥ 0 and pi(2n¯) ≤ 0}. Clearly
there is a great multiplicity of equilibria here. For example, in the case of
linear transport costs, we have
√
t
8F
≤ n¯ ≤
√
t
2F
.
Recall that the social optimum, nˆ =
√
t/4F , which lies in this range.
Hence the social optimum is an equilibrium, but there is also a continuum
of inefficient equilibria where one has both too many firms and too few
firms. This point has been noted by MacLeod et al. (1988), who analyze
such a two stage game with perfect price discrimination. Note also that the
excess entry equilibrium which obtains in our three stage game is always an
equilibrium in this model. To summarize, the two stage game has a large
number of equilibria, and in many of these, the firms make positive profits.
These equilibria have the flavor of entry-deterrence—the firms that enter
choose locations in such a way as to restrict the number of entrants.
The above argument, that the two stage game has a great mulitiplicity
of equilibria, extends to our more model of product differentiation. In par-
ticular, one can show that both the equilibrium outcome of the three stage
game and the social optimum is always equilibrium outcomes of the two
stage game. We show this formally below.
As in our earlier analysis, given a set of entrants, N , and product charac-
teristics, θn, second stage pricing policy will be efficient. An equilibrium in
the first stage will be a pair (n¯, θ¯n) such that i) for each firm i, θ¯i maximizes
profits given θ¯n \ {θi} and ii) no other firms find it profitable to enter.
An argument similar to our earlier analysis reveals that equilibrium, prod-
uct characteristics must be decentralized maximizers of social welfare, θ∗n.
Assume as before that every decentralized welfare maximum is also a global
maximum.
Consider the subgame perfect equilibrium from our three stage game,
(n∗,θ∗n∗). Let N
∗ denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n∗}. The n∗+1st firm will choose
product characteristic θ˜ ∈ argmaxθ[V (N∗ ∪ {n∗ +1},θ∗n∗ , θ)− V (N∗,θ∗n∗)].
The configuration (n∗,θ∗n∗) is an equilibrium if and only if pi(n
∗,θ∗n∗) ≥ 0
and pi(n∗ + 1,θ∗n∗ , θ˜) ≤ 0. The former must be true since we know that
(n∗,θ∗n∗) is an equilibrium of the three stage game. Writing out the latter
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reveals that:
(14)
pi(n∗ + 1,θ∗n∗ , θ˜) = V (N
∗ ∪ {n∗ + 1},θ∗n∗ , θ˜)− V (N∗,θ∗n∗)− F
≤ V (N∗ ∪ {n∗ + 1},θ∗n∗+1)− V (N∗,θ∗n∗+1 \ {θn∗+1})− F
≤ 0
To prove the first inequality, note that θ∗n∗+1 maximizes V when there are
n∗ + 1 firms, while θ∗n∗ maximizes V when there are n
∗ firms. The second
inequality, that this expression is non-positive, follows from the fact that n∗
is an equilibrium in the three stage game. Since an n∗ + 1st firm will be
unwilling to enter, the equilibrium outcome of the three stage game is also
an equilibrium outcome of the two stage game.
Next consider the welfare optimum, (nˆ,θ∗nˆ). Let Nˆ denote the set {1, 2, . . . , nˆ}.
Profits are non-negative since we know that (nˆ,θ∗nˆ) is welfare optimal so that
the nˆth firm’s contribution must exceed F . Again, the nˆ+1st firm will choose
product characteristic θ˜ ∈ argmaxθ[V (Nˆ ∪{nˆ+1},θ∗nˆ, θ)−V (Nˆ ,θ∗nˆ)]. Writ-
ing out its profits:
(15)
pi(nˆ+ 1,θ∗nˆ, θ˜) = V (Nˆ ∪ {nˆ+ 1},θ∗nˆ, θ˜)− V (Nˆ ,θ∗nˆ)− F
≤ V (Nˆ ∪ {nˆ+ 1},θ∗nˆ+1)− V (Nˆ ,θ∗nˆ)− F
≤ 0
where the second inequality follows from the fact that nˆ represents the op-
timal level of entry. Since an nˆ+1st firm will not find it profitable to enter,
there is also an equilibrium of the two stage game where the welfare optimal
number of firms enter. We have therefore proved the following result:
Proposition 2. The equilibrium outcome of three stage game and welfare
optimal outcome are equilibrium outcomes of the two stage game, under
assumptions 1–3.
One interpretation of the relevance of the two different extensive forms we
have analyzed is in terms of the ease with which firms can “rebrand” their
products. The arguments of Judd (1985) suggest that if the cost of brand
repositioning is relatively low, the efficient simultaneous entry/product choice
equilibrium is not credible. This is because when an unanticipated rival
chooses to enter, the remaining firms will prefer to rebrand their product.
In some industries, rebranding can be very costly and the analysis of this
section may be more relevant. In other industries where rebranding is rel-
atively costless, if firms can price discriminate effectively then one would
typically find the efficient choice of product characteristics and overentry.15
At the extreme of inflexibility is a situation where any potential firm is
endowed from the beginning with its product variety and cannot change this.
Consider for example, a Hotelling model, with consumers distributed uni-
formly on the unit interval, and with potential entrants distributed likewise
15For example, rebranding in the market for high-end sports cars would be quite expen-
sive while rebranding in the market for “economy cars” would be relatively inexpensive.
Indeed, physically identical cars are sometimes marketed as wholly different models by
different car manufacturers.
16 V. BHASKAR AND TED TO
on the unit interval. The potential entrant at location x has the technol-
ogy to supply variety x only. Such a model has a plethora of inefficient
equilibria—for example, if the firms located at 1/3 and 2/3 enter in equilib-
rium, then the firm located at 1/4 will not find it profitable to enter. Any
such equilibrium is a decentralized maximizer of social welfare, since the
entrant at 1/3 increases social welfare by entering rather than staying out,
given the decisions of all other firms.
To summarize, flexibility in rebranding promotes efficiency in product
variety choices for a given number of firms, but gives rise to excess entry.
The inability to rebrand gives rise to a very large number of equilibria in
product variety choices—this includes the efficient variety configuration, but
also inefficient ones.
3.7. Common Agency. Our analysis is directly applicable to the model
of common agency, introduced by Bernheim and Whinston (1986). This
has found extensive applications, especially in the contexts of government
contracting and lobbying. The canonical model of common agency with
complete information has a single agent who takes an action a in some set
A, with n principals who offer transfers to the agent contingent on the action
chosen. It is common in this literature to focus on truthful equilibrium—such
truthful equilibria always induce efficient outcomes in this game between the
principals.
Do we have efficiency in common agency when the principals have to
undertake prior non-contractible investments which affect payoffs in the
common agency game? This question has been raised by Bergemann and
Va¨lima¨ki (2001). They argue that such efficiency can be ensured if and
only if each principal can secure her marginal contribution in the truthful
equilibrium. If this is the case, they argue that investment incentives are
correctly specified. Our analysis in the present paper shows that marginal
contribution equilibria, in which each principal earns her marginal contri-
bution to social welfare, is not sufficient to ensure efficiency once one allows
for free entry into the ranks of principals. We illustrate our argument with
a simple example of common agency, which builds on our analysis of the
Salop model.
The government (who is the agent in our context) must choose the lo-
cation of a single public project, on the unit circle. We assume that the
government’s preferred ideal location is given by a point on this circle, but
this ideal location is uncertain, and not known initially, being distributed
uniformly on the circle. A project may only be located where there is a fa-
cility installed, and this installation has to take place before preferences are
known. The government’s utility from a project is given by a fixed number
minus the “transportation cost” which is a strictly increasing function of the
distance between the project’s location and the government’s ideal point.
The game we have is as follows. Entry takes place in stage one, and each
entrant incurs a sunk cost F . In stage two, each entrant must choose a
location to site her facility. In stage three, the government’s preferences are
realized, and this becomes common knowledge between the firms. The firms
then compete, where each firm quotes a price at which it will supply the
public project, at its location. Clearly, in the final stage, the project will
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be located at the firm which is closest to the government’s ideal point, and
this firm will make profits equal to the difference between the government’s
utility from its project and the next best project, while other firms make
zero revenues. Also, it is clear that firms will choose to site their facilities
equally spaced over the circle. Finally, it is also follows from our previous
analysis that there will be excess supply of facilities relative to the social
optimum. The government would be better off by taxing the construction of
such facilities, since by doing so it could reduce entry and ensure the social
optimum.16
4. Concluding Comments
Perfect price discrimination permits a firm to capture its marginal contri-
bution to social welfare. This ensures the existence of an equilibrium with
efficient product characteristic choice for a fixed number of firms, as has
been shown by a number of authors since Spence. These include Lederer and
Hurter (1986), MacLeod et al. (1988), and Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2001),
in the common agency context. Stuart (2001) develops this argument most
generally, and shows it is sufficient that a firm capture a proportion of its
marginal contribution, as would be the case if the terms of trade were set
by bargaining between the consumer and the firm.
The point of our paper is to consider unfettered entry, and to ask, does the
market provide the socially optimal number of firms and products? While
models of monopolistic competition agree that the answer is no, when firms
cannot price discriminate, they differ on the direction of the bias. The Salop
model shows that there will be overprovision of product variety, while in the
Dixit-Stiglitz model, one may have either overprovision or underprovision.
The literature agrees that there are two conflicting effects at work here—
a business stealing effect and an incomplete surplus extraction effect. The
business stealing effect makes for excessive entry.17 On the other hand, firms
are unable to appropriate their contribution to consumer surplus and hence
there is a tendency towards insufficient entry.
Our main result is that with perfect price discrimination, one has exces-
sive entry quite generally. In the light of the discussion above, one way of
thinking about this is that with discriminatory pricing, firms can fully ap-
propriate their contribution to consumer surplus and hence only the business
stealing effect remains. However, in the case of perfect price discrimination
there are two business stealing effects. Like the case of non-discriminatory
prices, there is a business stealing effect in the Mankiw-Whinston sense in
that an incremental firm forces its rivals to reduce production. This kind
of business stealing is not the source of overentry—each firm extracts only
the surplus it contributes to consumer utility (i.e., production decisions are
efficient). The source of overentry in our model is a second business steal-
ing effect that arises because existing firms adjust their choice of product
16Note the importance of uncertainty regarding government preferences. If government
preferences were certainly known at the outset, then only a single firm would enter, at the
government’s ideal location. This firm would be a monopolist vis-a-vis the government.
17This is the only effect in homogeneous good models, as Mankiw and Whinston (1986)
show.
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characteristics, accommodating the new entrant. Thus part of the entrants
profit is surplus that is transferred from its rivals. One way to think about
this is that although the marginal (nth) firm appropriates its marginal con-
tribution, the rents it appropriates are relative to an inefficient allocation
(i.e. when the remaining n − 1 firms are inefficiently located), rather than
an efficient one. Hence profits are greater than its contribution to welfare.
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